UDF (SA) Harley Davidson's in North Africa during 1940 to 1943 (Part 1)

Hi

The North Africa Campaign during the 2nd World War was a ping-pong battle between the Allied and the Axis forces.  The UDF (SA) Harley-Davidson's was used in the North Africa Campaign.  This is the 1st part of the North Africa Campaign that focus on the Western Desert campaign and the role that the Harley-Davidson’s played in the campaign.

BACKGROUND

Until Italy joined the war on 10 June 1940, the Second World War was mainly a European affair.  The German war machine overran Western Europe within the time span of a few months and as the main focus of Adolf Hitler, the German dictator, was the conquest of the Soviet Union.  Africa would have played virtually no role in this, had it not been for the dreams of conquest by the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini.  He wanted to exploit the precarious position of Britain and France in Europe to expand the Italian colonial empire in Africa.  Thus, on 10 June 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and France.

During October of the same year, Mussolini indicated that he wanted to incorporate British colonial territory into the Italian Empire.  He was especially interested in the Sudan and Egypt.  At that stage it looked like an easy venture as Britain was engaged in a life-and-death struggle in order to prevent a German invasion of the United Kingdom.  The British forces in the Middle East and North Africa were small and the Arab population was dissatisfied with their presence in their territories.

The map below depicts territories of the Allied Forces (Egypt, Sudan and French Equatorial Africa), and the Axis Forces (Italian East Africa, Libya and most of West Africa) at the beginning of 1940.

Map of North Africa in 1940, Source Wikipedia

The British control of this region included an area from the Egyptian/Libyan border to the Persian Gulf that for its geographic position and abundance of crude oil was of cardinal importance to the British war effort.

However, by 10 June 1940 the British were in a precarious situation.  Only 50 000 troops were available for the whole Middle East region.  In contrast, the Italian forces in Libya counted 500 000.  British reinforcements were on their way, but because of the presence of the Italian air force and navy in the Mediterranean, most of these had to be transported via the Cape sea route.  Therefore, it would take some time before a substantial build-up of forces could take place to reinforce the British position in the Middle East.

THE WESTERN DESERT CAMPAIGN

The Western Desert Campaign, or the Desert War, took place in the Western Desert of Egypt and Libya and was a theatre in the North African Campaign during the Second World War.

The Italian Opening Move

In spite of their quantitative advantage, the Italian forces in North Africa, under command of Marshall R.  Graziani, were inactive until September 1940.  On the 13th September the Italians half-heartedly invaded Egypt.  After advancing more or less 80 kilometres - the British forces conducted an orderly withdrawal - they erected a series of fortifications near Sidi Barrani, where they prepared for the resumption of an advance in mid-December deeper into Egypt. 

The 1st British Counter-Offensive (Operation Compass)

After Italian inactivity for two months, the arrival of reinforcements placed the British forces in a good position for a counter-offensive.  A British counter-offensive (Operation Compass) was initiated on December 9, 1940, led by General Sir Archibald Wavell.  From the start the British counter-offensive experienced little resistance from the Italians who were driven 800 kilometres westward.  Reaching El Agheila on 9 February 1941, the British conquest of the whole of Italian North Africa seemed possible.

Military operations, 13 September 1940 – 7 February 1941, Wikipedia

German Entry into North Africa

Adolf Hitler responded to the Italian disaster (11 January 1941) by ordering Unternehmen Sonnenblume (Operation Sunflower), the deployment of a new Afrika Korps to Libya, as a Sperrverband (barrier detachment).

Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, the newly appointed commander of the German contingent for North Africa, arrived in Tripoli ahead of his forces on 12 February 1941.  Two days later a reconnaissance battalion and an anti-tank unit arrived.  Rommel immediately despatched them to El Agheila to stem a possible British advance.  On 11 March, the first German tank regiment and a Luftwaffe contingent arrived in Tripoli.

The 1st German Counter-Offensive

Rommel's disposition did not allow him to sit and wait to see what the enemy would do first.  Contrary to instructions he took the initiative and launched an offensive.  The Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK) had fresh troops with better tanks, equipment and air support. 

The Axis force raided and quickly defeated the British at El Agheila on 24 March and at Mersa el Brega on 31 March.  Rommel exploited the success and by 11 April, the Axis forces had reached the Libyan/Egyptian border at Sollum, although the British forces managed to hold on to the harbour town of Tobruk.  The German force encircled and besieged Tobruk.

There, the opposing British and German-Italian armies remained stalemated until November 1941. 

Military operations, 24 March 1941 – 15 April 1941, Wikipedia

THE AXIS SEIGE OF TOBRUK

The Siege of Tobruk lasted for 241 days in 1941 after Axis forces advanced through Cyrenaica from El Agheila in Operation Sonnenblume against the British Western Desert Force (WDF) in Libya, during the Western Desert Campaign (1940–1943) of the Second World War.

Operation Sonnenblume (6 February – 25 May 1941), forced the British into a retreat to the Egyptian border.  A garrison was left behind at Tobruk, to deny the port to the Axis, while the WDF reorganised and prepared a counter-offensive.  The Axis siege of Tobruk began on 10 April, when the port was attacked by a force under General Erwin Rommel and continued during three Allied relief attempts, Operation Brevity (15–16 May 1941), Operation Battleaxe (15–17 June 1941) and Operation Crusader (18 November – 30 December 1941).  The occupation of Tobruk deprived the Axis of a supply port closer to the Egypt-Libya border than Benghazi 900 miles (1,400 km) west of the Egyptian frontier, which was within the range of RAF bombers; Tripoli was 1,500 kilometres (930 mi) to the west in Tripolitania.

For much of the siege, Tobruk was defended by the 9th Australian Division and other troops.  General Archibald Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command ordered Morshead to hold the fortress for eight weeks but the Australians held on for over five months, before being gradually withdrawn during September and replaced by the 70th Infantry Division, the Polish Carpathian Brigade and Czechoslovak 11th Infantry Battalion (East).

PREPARING FOR OPERATION 'CRUSADER"

Taking advantage of the diversion of Axis human and material resources from North Africa to the Eastern Front in Europe in the summer and autumn of 1941, a reorganised British Eighth Army (consisting of British, Australian, Indian, South African, New Zealander, and Free French soldiers) attacked Rommel's positions in what was known as Operation “Crusader.”

The Arrival of the UDF's Harley-Davidson's in North Africa

When the East African campaign ended, part of No 1 Motorcycle Company left with No 2 Motorcycle Company for the Middle East in September 1941, where they were seconded to the South African Armoured Cars for participation in the operations against the DAK in Egypt and Libya in the Western Desert of North Africa.  

No 1 Motorcycle Company, as part of the 1st South African Division, was shipped to Alexandria in Egypt via the Eritrean port of Massawa.  Upon arrival in Egypt, the 1st South African Division was allocated Mersah Matruh as their base areas while the 2nd South African Infantry Division was stationed at Mareopolis near Alexandria.  It would be at Mersah Matruh that the 1st South African Infantry Division, would for the first time since its formation in the Union have all three its brigades in one location.  A troop train awaited the troops at Port Tewfik and after having been filled to the brim would start its long hot journey to Amariyah, a military encampment not far from Alexandria.  The South Africans were not impressed with their first encounter with Egypt.  They complained about the flies, fleas, dust, heat and dirt.

It was in Egypt that the South Africans (referred to as the Springboks) experienced their first, but by no means the last, determined air raid of the war.  Gone were the days of pairs of Capronis lazily passing over South African positions and conducting half-hearted and inaccurate bombing runs.  Air raids took place at night over the harbour at Alexandria where numbers of Royal Navy ships were moored.  The air raids in East Africa usually commenced at dawn when the troops were supposed to be most vulnerable or at dusk when pursuit would be inevitable, but never at night.  The Egyptian anti-aircraft guns fired in the general direction of the raiders, with a percentage of the shells aimed at the army camp at Amariyah.  When this happened the troops had to take cover, and it was their first introduction to hostile fire as it was argued that certain members of the Egyptian army were not at all friendly toward the Allied troops.  Closer to the front line the troops discovered that the German weapon of choice for raining destruction from the air was the JU87 Stuka dive-bomber.  It was as frightening as it was lethal.  It carried one 500-lb bomb between its dangling undercarriage.  Four smaller bombs were hung beneath the wide wings of the aircraft, and on one of its hanging legs was attached a siren actuated by a propeller whirring in the wind, giving off a piercing shriek with the intention of paralysing its victims with fear.  The bombs were designed to detonate on contact with the stony desert floor with a deafening crack, sending jagged white hot steel splinters and sharp-edged broken stones flying almost horizontally through the air.

One of the UDF Signallers (Dispatch Rider) on his Harley-Davidson 45

At Mersa Matruh, the Springboks went to ground, or rather underground.  The constant German air attacks necessitated the digging of bunkers and underground passages, many of which became quite elaborate.  Describing his lodgings as a “porcupine’s warren”, one soldier wrote to his parents that they have two large rooms, a storeroom, kitchen and pantry, all underground.  In his following letter, he informed his parents that they had improved their “termites nest” and added a large underground dining room with a floor of sandbags and a table in the centre.  The presence of fleas and lice, however, forced many a Springbok to sleep above ground and only share the underground safety with its unwelcome inhabitants when an air raid was imminent.

UDF Trains for Desert Operations

The Division received the minimum number of old battered trucks.  With insufficient motorised transport available, the division resorted back to the laying of minefields and digging more defences in the Mersa Matruh area.  For the time being, the sorely needed training in desert movement, night movement and navigation would have to be postponed.  During the East African campaign, the South Africans drove in single file, often forced to do so by dense bush, and deployed on foot.  What they now needed in the Western desert was to practise mass movement in the desert.  With transport still lacking, the South Africans continued working on new defensive positions, gun emplacements, concrete pillboxes, clearing of tank ditches, laying of mines and the erection of wire, sometimes for up to twelve hours per day.  It was this state of semi-unpreparedness that was to lead to the delay of the Crusader campaign and caused a rift between the South African field commanders and their British superiors.

After repeated appeals by the division commander, suitable and desert-worthy vehicles began to arrive early October.  The 1st South African Division commenced its first lessons in desert training on 11 October 1941 in all earnest.  The men on the ground were determined to master this new way of war in the shortest possible time.  The slow movement through the Western Desert was intended so that the troops might be thoroughly acclimatised to desert conditions.  This toughened them up and they soon became accustomed to the dust, sand and bumpy roads.

One of the UDF Harley-Davidson's with a side car in the Western Desert (the tires were deflated to allow the motorcycles to drive on the soft desert sand)

The Division received the minimum number of old battered trucks.  With insufficient motorised transport available, the division resorted back to the laying of minefields and digging more defences in the Mersa Matruh area.  For the time being, the sorely needed training in desert movement, night movement and navigation would have to be postponed.  During the East African campaign, the South Africans drove in single file, often forced to do so by dense bush, and deployed on foot.  What they now needed in the Western desert was to practise mass movement in the desert.  With transport still lacking, the South Africans continued working on new defensive positions, gun emplacements, concrete pillboxes, clearing of tank ditches, laying of mines and the erection of wire, sometimes for up to twelve hours per day.  It was this state of semi-unpreparedness that was to lead to the delay of the Crusader campaign and caused a rift between the South African field commanders and their British superiors.

After repeated appeals by the division commander, suitable and desert-worthy vehicles began to arrive early October.  The 1st South African Division commenced its first lessons in desert training on 11 October 1941 in all earnest.  The men on the ground were determined to master this new way of war in the shortest possible time.  The slow movement through the Western Desert was intended so that the troops might be thoroughly acclimatised to desert conditions.  This toughened them up and they soon became accustomed to the dust, sand and bumpy roads. 

OPERATION CRUSADER: 17TH TO THE 22ND NOVEMBER 1941

As October changed into November few UDF commanders had any illusions regarding the battle readiness of the UDF brigades.  On 8 November, the two corps commanders General Godwin-Austin (13th Corps) and General Norrie (30th Corps) issued their operational orders to subordinate commanders.  At this stage, the 2nd South African Infantry Division was stuck at El-Alamein laying mines and preparing defences.  The 1st South African Infantry Division was still busy with its desert training with its 1st Brigade having barely begun exercising in countering armoured attacks while the 5th Brigade did not even progress past the battalion scheme exercises and would not be ready when General Sir Alan Cunningham’s Operation Crusader commenced on 15 November.  General C.  Auchinleck, as commander-in-chief Middle East Command, wrote to Churchill expressing his severe disappointment at the state of readiness of the South Africans but defended his decision to postpone offensive operations by three days to allow the South African commander’s time to carry out one last exercise.  

The 1st South African Infantry Division left its base at Mersa Matruh on 3, 4 and 5 November en-route to their respective jump-off points for the battle to come.  Determined to squeeze in as much training as possible, the South Africans conducted exercises while moving to their concentration areas near the border between Egypt and Libya.  It was during these exercises, that it was discovered that according to the 8th Army’s supply plans, the brigades had to cover eight miles to the gallon of fuel.  With the state the vehicles were in, tough terrain and leaking fuel cans, the 5th South African Infantry Brigade could only manage four miles to the gallon.  This resulted in the brigade running out of fuel halfway to the concentration area.

Cunningham’s aim with Crusader was to draw out the enemy armour in the Tobruk area and to eliminate it as fighting force.  This would lead to the relief of the Tobruk garrison that has been under siege for almost a year and, in all likelihood, the retreat of the Axis forces from Eastern Libya.  The concept of the plans was based on splitting his force into three groups.  The Northern group would isolate the enemy in the Sollum-Sidi Omar region.  The centre force would be responsible for drawing away the enemy armour from the Northern group in the direction of the Southern group.  The Southern group consisted of the 7th British Armoured Division, 1st South African Infantry Division and the 2nd Guards Brigade with the task of seeking out enemy armoured formations, destroying them and relieving the besieged Tobruk garrison.  In spite of the decision to split up the British tank forces and the concern of the infantry commanders at having to fight tanks, the allied forces crossed the Wire during the night of 17/18 November 1941.

Movements during Operation Crusader (source - Wikipedia)

With the lumbering mass of vehicles of the 8th Army moving in a western direction into Libya, the general feeling was that no-one had a clear idea of what was happening or where they were going.  The 1st South African Infantry Division, on 18 and 19 November, followed in the tracks of the 7th British Armoured Division, eagerly awaiting the conclusion of the armoured battle.  On 19 November, in the afternoon, Brink received orders to dispatch 1st South African Infantry Brigade to Gueret Hamza and the 5th South African Infantry Brigade to El Cuasc.  Moving into position, the 1st South African Infantry Brigade was the target of a determined air attack which claimed 19 lives.  It was during this movement that the 22nd British Armoured Brigade charged headlong into Italian defensive positions at Bir el Gubi.

This engagement, described by General Norrie as an encounter battle, carried out too enthusiastically against prepared positions, failed to dislodge the defenders.  At day’s end, fifty per cent of the brigade’s tanks remained on the battlefield as either smouldering heaps or useless hunks of metal.  This attack by untrained troops in their first action since arriving in the desert resulted in one of the three armoured groups, tasked with destroying the German armour, was unable to play its part without substantial reinforcements.  It also meant that the 1st South African Infantry Brigade’s attack on Bir el Gubi on 20 November was called off but more critically was the fact that the South Africans were now without direct tank support.

Having failed to lure the Germans into the trap, the Army Commander revised the original Crusader plan to focus on a drive on the Italian-held landing strip at Sidi Rezegh, in order to achieve at least one of the predetermined objectives.  With the armour of the southern force tied up at Bir el Gubi, the northern force guarding the left flank of 13th Corps, the only armour then available to execute Cunningham’s plan of destruction was the lone 7th Armoured Brigade.  Brink was ordered to dispatch one of his brigade’s north in support of the attack on the airfield.  With Brigadier Dan Pienaar’s 1st South African Infantry Brigade masking Bir el Gubi, the task of following the armour fell on Brigadier B.F.  Armstrong’s 5th Brigade, which was instructed to take up a position on the third escarpment overlooking the landing strip.  Darkness, however, descended upon the battlefield before the brigade could reach the escarpment and since it was not sufficiently trained in night movement, the brigade commander did not want to cover the last couple of miles in the dark.  The 5th South African Infantry Brigade consequently camped in a laager in the open desert with all intention of resuming its march at dawn on 21 November.

In the afternoon of the same day, General Cruewell, commanding the German armour, obliged Cunningham by advancing on the 4th Armoured Brigade at Gabr Saleh.  Instead of relief, the news of the German movement created a panic at Army HQ.  There were no longer three armoured brigades waiting for the enemy but only one.  If the Germans managed to brush the British tanks aside, they would crush the remainder of 13th Corps and cut off the rest of the army from its sources of supply in Egypt.  Upon failing to eliminate the British forces in the east, the Germans, now two divisions strong after having linked up during the night, turned west in order to push the British off the landing strip and crush the 7th British Armoured Brigade and its supporting elements.  Cunningham, thinking the enemy was withdrawing ordered up his armour in pursuit.  On 22 November, Rommel pushed the British off the airfield and beat back the attacks made by the 4th and 2nd Armoured Brigades respectively.  With most of his armour destroyed or put out of action, Cunningham lost the decisive armoured battle that was crucial for Crusader’s success.  As survivors of the tank battle limped back in the direction of the Wire, the fate of the 5th South African Infantry Brigade was sealed.

A counterattack by the Transvaal Scottish failed to regain the airfield and the 5th South African Infantry Brigade attempted to dig in for the defence just south of point 178.  At 07:30, the German armour began their advance south from Sidi Rezegh.  In spite of having been observed by South African armoured cars, the German movement proceeded unopposed.  Attempts at defending the perimeter commenced as soon as what was left of the echelon vehicles closed up on the Brigade HQ.  On the periphery, were the infantry, the artillery behind them and Brigade HQ in the centre.  The infantry dug themselves in – at least they tried to do so.  The ground was hard shale, extremely difficult to penetrate with pick and shovel.  The extremely rocky ground prevented effective entrenching and resulted in slit trenches of only inches deep, leaving the troops partially exposed.  

The Brigade’s anti-tank guns remained on their portees in order to be easily deployed as the situation demanded.  Armstrong deployed what antitank weapons he possessed along the four sectors of his defensive box and included 46 25-pounder artillery pieces, 2 18-pounder anti-tank guns and 26 2-pounder anti-tank guns.  In addition, he could call on the limited support of a few of the surviving tanks of the previous days’ tank battle.  During the night of 22 November, strong German armoured elements moved south in the direction of the yet undiscovered South African brigade.  At 07:30 the next morning, the static South African units were spotted and the German commander, on his own initiative, ordered his force to turn west and engage the enemy.

IMPORTANT NOTES

• The rest will follow as Part 2 and Part 3.
• I have done a lot of research and I am doing some more.  I will post the sources that I have used for the North Africa Campaign with the last post.