OPERATION CRUSADER: 23RD NOVEMBER 1941 - “TOTENSONNTAG” THE SUNDAY OF THE DEAD
In 1941, 23 November was the last Sunday of the ecclesiastical year, called officially in England the 'Sunday next before Advent' and known to the more light-hearted occupants of the pews as 'Stir-up Sunday'. In Germany it was Totensonntag, 'Sunday of the Dead', a kind of Lutheran All Souls' Day, and the battle of 23 November became known in Panzergruppe by this forbidding name.
At Sidi Rezegh the 23rd was ushered in by a cold wind which cut through even the warmest clothing', and the weather became 'showery, with much low cloud throughout the day. But in spite of showers and the bitter desert wind which whipped up the loose sand and stung the raw skin of exposed hands and faces, contemporary accounts on either side have little to say about the weather.
The Axis Forces during the Night of the 22 / 23 November 1941
During the night of 22/23 November, the German forces remained on the ground they had seized during the day. The tanks of 21st Panzer Division, which had suffered heavily in their attack of the previous afternoon, leaguered near the airfield of Sidi Rezegh, with Group Knabe along the Sidi Rezegh escarpment from which they had driven the King's Royal Rifle Corps. 15th Panzer, after overrunning the Headquarters of 4th Armoured Brigade and the 8th Hussars, and beating off the counterattack of 5 RTR, settled down somewhere near Abiar en Nbeidat. Infantry Regiment 155 (Group Mickl) remained on the line of the third escarpment west of Point 178, and Regiment 361 on Point 175. The Italian XXI Corps remained in the lines of investment round Tobruk, and claimed to have halted attempts of British armour to break out of the Fortress, while Corps Gambara, which reported the repulse of an attack by 1st S.A. Division during the 22nd, maintained Ariete Division at Bir el Gubi.
At 22:30 on the 22nd November, Field Marshall Rommel issued and order “On 23 November, Panzergruppe will force a decision in the area southeast of Tobruk, by means of a concentric attack by D.A.K. and parts of Corps Gambara. With this object, Corps Gambara will advance from El Gubi at 0800 hours with elements of Panzer Division Ariete in the direction of Gambut. At 0700 hours on 23 November, D.A.K., effectively concentrating its forces, will advance in the general direction of El Gubi - with main effort on the left wing, encircle the enemy and destroy them. Recognition signal for German and Italian troops: two white Very lights. Troops must be reminded that Ariete Division is using a number of captured enemy vehicles.” In other words, Rommel proposed to catch 7th Armoured Division between a frontal assault made by the Afrikakorps southward, and an attack delivered by Ariete against its rear.
Advance of the Duetche Afrika Korps (DAK)
The DAK left their positions at 05:45 on the 23rd November to their assembly point. At 06:30 most of the DAK forces were at the assembly point, but Panzer Regiment 5 was late in coming up from its night leaguer near the landing-ground, and at 07:30 15th Panzer moved off alone, with Panzer Regiment 8 leading and 15th Rifle Brigade-containing the infantry component of the Division - echeloned behind to the right. According to 15th Panzer's War Diary, 'the artillery, as usual, would have one Batterie between the two waves of tanks, and the rest behind the Panzer Regiment'. By then the mist had settled in.
The German advance was first observed by Lieut. van Niekerk of 4th S.A. Armoured Cars, who reported the assembly of 100 tanks about 2 miles south of Abiar en Nbeidat, and their advance due south, but the 'higher authority' to whom he made his report 'evinced a strong disinclination to accept it, and appeared to be convinced either that the alleged column did not exist at all, or if it did exist, that it was friendly'.
Contact with 7th British Armoured Division
German artillery began a steady bombardment of the brigade positions as the first shells came over with an unearthly scream and burst within the perimeter. They were loaded with steel balls which, when released from their steel casing by the deafening explosion, buzzed through the air like a swarm of angry bees. The South African artillery answered and the gunners could be seen through the rising clouds of dust, stripped to the waist in the heat of battle, firing their 25-pounder guns over open sights as if their very lives depended on it, as indeed it did.
Almost at the same moment, 7th Armoured Brigade, which 'consisted only of ten tanks of the 7th Hussars, a few crocks of the 2nd RTR and three of Brigade Headquarters', was under orders to move to [Bir] er Reghem el Gharbi, 15 miles to the south where they were to remain in reserve. They had just begun the southward march when '4th South African Armoured Car Regiment reported a strong enemy column including a large number of tanks moving south-west a mile away. Captain de Beer, adjutant of the Armoured Car Regiment, said afterwards that he had been very anxious as he knew the report would sound improbable.
Through the thickening clouds of dust enemy tanks could be seen milling around on the edge of the defencive box. Behind the tanks were lorried infantry, waiting for the moment when they could de-bus and clear up the objective. The British tanks of the 7th Armoured Brigade got across for the loss of one cruiser, then halted, and engaged the German column from the flank. As the German tanks penetrated the South African defences from the south and begin to engage the infantry battalions on the perimeter, organised resistance came to an end. The Germans wheeled west and rampaged through the 5th South African Brigade’s B echelon vehicles and other transport vehicles.
At approximately 0800 hours', as R.Q.M.S. Floquet of 2nd Regiment Botha subsequently reported, the 'B' Echelon was attacked on all sides by enemy tanks and light artillery. I was trying to deepen my shell slit when suddenly I heard V.M.G. and Bren fire opening up furiously. A few seconds later a shower of bullets sang over our heads and shells fired from light artillery started bursting on the western and eastern flank every rime I put my head out of my shell slit I saw red tracer bullets and armour-piercing bullets thudding into the ground all round me. We all fired furiously back whenever a tank could be discerned on the horizon, but the utter futility of small arms fire against such heavy armoured opposition convinced me that the only way was to try and escape in a truck. My driver and I made a bold dash and we scrambled into the truck. Due west appeared to be the only way out and as we dashed off in that direction shells burst within ten and fifteen yards on our sides and in front.
In the course of their drive into the 5th Brigade Echelon the German tanks overran 10th Platoon of the divisional machine-gun battalion, Regiment President Steyn, who were taken prisoner while trying hopelessly to hold up the attack with their small-arms.
They regained their liberty, however, when the Germans withdrew. British tanks and guns likewise appeared in the Echelon and a staff-sergeant with the Echelon of the Regiment Botha described how British artillery kept rushing from one side of our lines to the other. Pandemonium appeared to have broken loose. We all fired with our rifles and a tommy-gun on German tanks which we saw not far distant. The firing was passing continually over our heads. One British tank ran right over the shell slit in which our driver was crouching, next to the truck, covering him with earth. A British anti-tank gun took up its position right next to us, firing over our heads. The ground shook with the reverberations of the heavy firing and the falling of shells all around us and we saw German tanks on all sides.
One of the groups of British tanks engaged was a detachment of 3rd RTR under Major 'Bob' Crisp, and an observer with 4th South African Armoured Cars said afterwards, 'I shall never forget how they came out of the 5th Brigade Echelon and at a certain distance went into line abreast and charged down upon the German Juggernaut'.
Completely surprised though the British were, they yet put up a resistance which impressed their opponents. 'Again and again', says the War Diary of 15th Panzer, 'strong enemy battle groups with tanks, antitank guns and artillery came out of the desert and tried to take the Division in flank to divert it from its objective.' Major Fenski, commander of the first battalion of Panzer Regiment 8, was killed, and in another clash a Batterie of Artillery Regiment 33 was 'overrun by a sudden charge of English tanks and forced to surrender - an incident which tallies exactly with the record of one of Major Crisp's exploits.
Crisp belonged to 3rd RTR from 4th Armoured Brigade, and early that morning he was trying to find his regiment when he stumbled across a leaguer of South Africans (probably 1st S.A. Brigade). After a friendly welcome and entertainment he covered the short intervening distance to reach 5th S.A. Brigade just as the German attack came in. Here he noticed that a force of hostile tanks and lorries had been beaten off, leaving four field-guns (a German Battens) in the open, firing over the heads of their own column and apparently into the 1st Brigade leaguer. 'It seemed to me a monstrous bit of cheek', said Crisp, 'and got my back up', and he ordered his driver to charge the mile or so of desert that lay between, knowing well enough that if he were detected the guns would make short work of him.
The Germans spotted him when he was 300 yards off and before long he could see their panic and their alarmed faces. He watched the nearest gun swing round and a puff of black smoke flash from its muzzle. 'I could afford to laugh at this', he related, 'and believe I actually did, as the gun was pointing skyward at a range of about 6000 yards, and there was I not 100 yards away. I knew I had them.'
Crisp overran the guns and ordered the personnel to march back to 5th Brigade as prisoners, but could not wait to see the end. The Diary of 15th Panzer maintains, however, that the Batterie was recaptured and afterwards brought into action again.
The reaction of the tanks and artillery, fragmentary and uncoordinated, was forceful enough to change the course of the action. General Neumann-Silkow was convinced that the advantage must be pursued to the uttermost, and ordered up 15th Rifle Brigade 'to mop up the vehicles captured by our tanks and collect prisoners'. He was certain that the advance to Bir el Gubi must be abandoned and the day's operations be redesigned to deal with the conditions which had now been revealed. But Cruewell was impressed by the vigour of the counter-attacks which had come in against him, partial and unpremeditated as they were, and was loath to abandon his plans.
The DAK Replenish
After disengaging from its thrust into the administrative area of 5th South African Brigade, Panzer Regiment 8 spent some time in reorganization and replenishment before resuming the advance towards Bir el Gubi at 11:30 hours. According to the War Diary of 21st Panzer, 15th Panzer pushed about 20 km. west from Sidi Muftah, which is probably rather an over-estimate. On the way the Regiment ran into 'an impassable swamp', from which, they say, they could extricate themselves only with difficulty.
At 12:35 Afrikakorps made contact with 'about two-thirds' of Ariete 12 km. north-east of Bir el Gubi, and General Cruewell proceeded to make his dispositions for a decisive attack on the invaders. 'The intention', according to the D.A.K. War Diary, 'was to push the enemy south of Sidi Rezegh back to the north on to 21 Pz Div's defence line, and then to join forces with Pz Div and destroy him. Attack to begin 14:00 hours.' Ariete was assigned to the post on the left of 15th Panzer Division. The general intention was that the three armoured formations, with Panzer Regiment 8 in the middle, Panzer Regiment 5 on the right and Ariete on the left, should sweep down in one long line, with the units of 15th Rifle Brigade a few hundred yards behind, to overwhelm 7th Armoured Division.
The Annihilation of the UDF’s 5th South African Infantry Brigade
For most of 5th S.A. Infantry Brigade the Sunday morning passed uneventfully. The whole leaguer was subject to a harassing shell-fire, most of which came from the heavy artillery of Group Boettcher on the slopes of Belhamed, though some members of the Brigade wondered privately whether over-enthusiasm on the part of their fellow brigade away to the south might not have something to do with it. Men in the artillery and infantry had some steady digging to take their minds off the disadvantages of their situation, but the rocky soil put any serious entrenching out of the question. 3rd Transvaal Scottish claimed to be 'fairly well dug in', in spite of 'the extremely rocky nature of the ground', but a company commander of the Regiment Botha on their right remembers that 'the men tried to dig in but the desert was too rocky. Only one mortar was properly dug in, the other only a foot or two, while the slit trenches were a matter of inches.' The digging-in of field-guns was no more successful, and most of the 2-pounder anti-tank guns remained on their portees.
After the excitements of the early morning the B Echelon settled down, rather more relieved at the disappearance of the panzers than the situation altogether justified. In spite of their losses, they still formed what the Germans described as 'an enormous concentration of vehicles', and 'towards midday', says the report of 4th S.A. Reserve Motor Transport Company, 'orders were received for B Echelon to close up on Bde H.Q. and spread out on the right flank'. The Scots Guards say that 'the entire B Echelon of 5 S.A. Bde was inside the perimeter of defence', but this means little more than that they were not actually detached from their parent formation, and that some artillery positions lay along the southern front.
The defence of the unprotected south face attracted the attention of General Gott, who had spent the night within the 5th Brigade leaguer and now advised Brigadier Armstrong on the problem of strengthening the position. He ordered the Scots Guards to come under command of 5th Brigade, and sited D Battery of 3rd Royal Horse Artillery with its twelve 2-pounders, also from Support Group, in the B Echelon area to meet any further attack from the south. The composite regiment of 22nd Armoured Brigade, with two batteries of 25-pounders from 2nd Royal Horse Artillery, 'took up a hull-down position near the south-west corner of 5 S.A. Bde Gp leaguer'. At the same time General Gott withdrew the Headquarters and the remainder of the infantry of 7th Support Group from the flank of 5th Brigade, but left 4th Royal Horse Artillery to cover that side of the position.
The commander of 3rd S.A. Field Regiment, Lt.-Col. I. B. Whyte, stated in his report, 'About 11:30 hours I was told by Gen Gott that 16 guns of 4 R.H.A. would cover our north-eastern flank from which a tank attack was expected. I contacted their O.C. Lt Col Gurrie and laid a wire to him.' With this additional support on the flank of the Brigade, Whyte was able to strengthen the southern front, and he describes how he 'moved 7 Fd Bty from our eastern flank to our southern flank and re-sited the A/Tk Troops to give A/Tk protection between the 25-pr btys'. The report of Major Greenwood, one of 'Whyte's battery commanders, describes how E Troop of 9th S.A. Field Battery was moved from the northern flank of S.A. Irish to meet an attack from the south-west and a troop (probably of six guns) from 60th Field Regiment R.A. was brought in to take its place. At the same time most of the guns of 3rd S.A. Anti-Tank Battery were moved to protect the Brigade against an attack from the south. I Troop, which had been with 3rd Transvaal Scottish, was placed on the western flank of the B Echelon, and three guns of K Troop were brought from the sector of and Regiment Botha and disposed on the B Echelon's south-eastern flank. Two guns of J Troop (with the S.A. Irish) were sited to fire from a position between the B Echelon and the Irish.
The South African anti-tank guns remained on their portees, and General Gott afterwards remarked, 'Many of our portee anti-tank guns were set alight by enemy fire before the tanks got within range, and that was a contributory cause to the Germans' success. The lesson is to have the guns off the truck and dug-in.' Apart, however, from the feasibility of digging in at all, it should be remembered that the situation was extremely fluid. The intentions of the enemy were unknown, and General Gott himself warned the South Africans to be prepared for an attack from the north - whence Rommel had, in fact, intended the main thrust to come. Cruewell's elaborate outflanking movement might turn out to be a mere feint, and the way in which the tanks disengaged during the morning, when all was going well, might be taken as confirmation. That very afternoon, moreover, L Troop of 33rd New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery engaged the Germans from their portees on the flank of the South African Brigade.
After the move to their new positions, the gunners observed a good deal of enemy movement to the south and south-west. Lieutenant Allen, the Gun Position Officer of E Troop of 9th S.A. Field Battery, described how thirty tanks moving off to the south-west were engaged over open sights. They halted about 4000 yards away and we continued to harass them and other targets with observed fire on and off for a couple of hours. I saw only one tank definitely out of action. The tanks then moved out of sight. Things remained fairly quiet after that, except for some desultory and not very accurate counter-battery shelling from a northerly direction.
Towards midday, Brigade Headquarters had a welcome reminder that they were not alone in the struggle. Brigadier Barrowclough had arrived at Bir Sciuearat after his night march and, while preparing to assault Point 175, sent off his 26th Battalion to make contact with the South Africans. The Battalion reached its allotted area, south-west of Hareifet en Nbeidat and a mile or two east of 5th S.A. Brigade, at 12:25, says their history.
The CO [Lt.-Col. J. R. Page] left to establish contact with the South Africans. When he reached their headquarters he was informed that a tank-supported attack was expected at any time. Reconnaissance had shown that the enemy was organising a large striking force behind the southern escarpment. The supporting arms with the brigade were not strong enough to break up this concentration. Long-range guns had already started several fires in the South African sector and the tempo of enemy shelling was steadily increasing. Somewhat perturbed by this news Lt Col Page returned to his headquarters. Beside his bad news, however, he was able to bring back some anti-tank ammunition.
About midday the German guns to the north - the heavy guns of Group Boettcher on Belhamed and those of 21st Panzer Division nearer at hand - began a steady bombardment of the 5th Brigade position. The Transvaal Scottish say: “The enemy shells were directed against our own arty, which were on either side and just forward of Battalion H.Q. The enemy Arty O.P. must have been very well sighted, as their fire was particularly deadly on any vehicle which dared approach anywhere near the front line. This made the bringing forward of ammunition extremely difficult. Just after 1400 hours, when communications forward had broken down, Major Rosser went forward, leaving Capt Ruddock and Major Berry at B.H.Q. Major Rosser found that in spite of the heavy barrage very few casualties had occurred in our lines and the men were in good spirits and calmly awaiting an expected infantry attack.”
The heavy bombardment certainly seemed to presage an attack from the north, and Brigade Headquarters sent up the Reserve Company of the Regiment President Steyn to cover the northern face, and ordered both the Regiment Botha and the South African Irish to detach a company apiece to prepare a second line of defence about 1,000 yards in rear of the Scottish front line. Two anti-tank guns from I Troop were moved back from the B Echelon to support the Transvaal Scottish.
About 14:00 hours General Gott left the South African perimeter. Before he went he warned Brigade Headquarters of the danger from the southwest, and the Brigade Report says that 'Comd 7 Armd Div assured the Bde Comd that with the guns available on that sector our tanks would be able to take care of the enemy'.
General Gott had also told Colonel Page that he should site the guns with 26th New Zealand Battalion to cover the north, south, and east faces of their position: on the west, 4th Royal Horse Artillery - who were deployed on a line running between the South African Brigade and the New Zealanders - would be able to give them protection. The General drove first to the headquarters of C Squadron of 4th S.A. Armoured Gars, which lay north-east of the Brigade, and used them as his personal escort for the rest of the day. Here he stayed for some time while matters worked up to a crisis, sitting 'right up on his turret', quite unmoved by the 'overs' and ricochets from the battles to south and east, and the harassing fire from the north, and rallying the squadron commander for 'ducking' more than once as he walked across from his armoured car to report. Colonel Larmuth remembers that 'Gott repeatedly would ask about enemy guns and tank positions and spoke endlessly at times into his mike'.
While he was at Larmuth's headquarters, news came through from the South African armoured cars south of the 5th Brigade that the German column had 'formed up almost in line abreast and facing north', and Lannuth says: I asked Gott about this and he said he knew all about it. He said the enemy force there would be tackled 'later on' if it wasn't too late. He said distinctly to me that 'Your South African Brigade seems stuck down with gum - they won't move and they won't turn their artillery round and they are not dug in - I am sorry for them'. This rather shocked me and Gott said that he could not get them to move round and it was too late to dig. He said he couldn't understand them at all.
From midday onwards the forces of the Afrikakorps to the south and west of 5th Brigade proceeded to reorganize along a line which stretched southeastward from Bir el Haiad. 15th Panzer complained that their redeployment was hampered by hostile artillery fire, which could not be evaded owing to the marshy character of the area in which they lay. Colonel Kriebel remarks that the assembly was hampered by 'heavy fire from over 100 enemy guns which could not be kept down by our weak artillery', and though his estimate is much exaggerated it serves as a useful corrective to the complaint of many South African survivors that the enemy had been allowed to concentrate with no interference whatever. The twenty-four field-guns and four of the mediums with 1st S.A. Brigade were certainly firing on the Germans from the south, and, in all probability, G Battery of 2nd Royal Horse Artillery with the composite regiment of 22nd Armoured Brigade was also in action on the north. In 5th Brigade, however, Lieut.-Colonel Whyte of 3rd S.A. Field Regiment was chary of firing since he knew that 1st S.A. Brigade was close at hand and on its way up to support them, and 'owing to the mirage positive identification was impossible'. Nevertheless, a certain amount of fire was brought down on specific targets. At 14:45, when the hostile character of the concentration to the south-west was becoming clear, E Troop of 9th S.A. Field Battery was engaging what seemed to be 'about 150 [tanks] with a number of big vehicles'.
By 15:00 hours Cruewell had got his long lines of tanks and vehicles marshalled in something like the parade-ground style he had intended, and he gave the order to advance. Once the Afrikakorps had set out on its charge, the less time spent in dallying the better, and they moved swiftly. 'At about 15:15', says Captain Cowley, 'approx 200 enemy vehicles headed by tanks made an attack from the south-west, and the troop on my orders immediately engaged them over open sights.' The Gun Position Officer, Lieut. K. B. Allen, says, “A large body of transport came over the horizon to the South moving from right to left diagonally towards us. We opened fire over open sights as soon as we distinguished them as enemy vehicles. The transport column was followed by a force of at least 70 tanks which cut in towards us making for the centre of the Irish position. Our guns engaged them continuously, swinging more and more to the left until they were outflanked by the tanks. The tanks kept up A.P. and M.G. fire all the time.”
Heavy fighting broke out at once. A terrific fire front of well over 100 guns concentrated on the two attacking panzer regiments and the two rifle regiments following close behind in their vehicles. A concentration of anti-tank weapons unusual in this theatre of war, and cleverly hidden among enemy vehicles which had been knocked out during the morning, inflicted heavy losses on the two rifle regiments. The flanking fire was particularly irksome which came from the left [i.e. the area of the S.A. Irish], the sector of Panzer Division Ariete, which had not yet embarked on the attack.
Panzer Regiment 8 reported that as they advanced, covered by the fire of their Artillery Regiment 33, the hostile shell-fire which had hampered their assembly 'increased to a terrific extent'. Lieut.-Colonel Cramer, the regimental commander, drove straight into the enemy before him: 'he personally led the regiment forward, and at every sign of faltering spurred it on by brief exhortations over the air', and by 15:30 the first battalion under Captain Kuemmel had broken into the South African position.
Behind the tanks came Rifle Regiment 115 which increased its speed under 'the terrific shell and tank fire'. As they came in sight over the rise 'the first aimed fire was opened on the regiment, which suffered casualties to men and vehicles. Lieut.-Colonel Zintel, unperturbed, led the regiment standing upright in his vehicle.' The second battalion of the regiment had come up level with the first, 200 metres from the enemy's lines, when heavy machine-gun and anti-tank fire fell on them from the left flank, and the regimental commander, who had intended to cover the last few paces in his transport, was compelled to debus. 'One of the first to be killed was Lieut.-Colonel Zintel, who was hit by machine-gun fire at the head of the regiment barely 100 metres from the foremost enemy positions. The enemy defensive fire reopened in front. Soon most of the officers and NCOs of the regiment were killed or wounded.'
The War Diary of 15th Panzer Division takes up the tale and describes how Major von Grolman (I/115) led the armoured company forward to relieve the regiment. He also was killed. The regiment was brought to a standstill. Almost all its vehicles were immobilized and it was under heavy defensive fire. The divisional commander came forward to the front line of Rifle Regiment 115 and ordered the adjutant, Lieut Struckmann, to rally the regiment and continue the attack.
In the confusion the original plan, which had envisaged the infantry following in the path of the tanks, had gone astray, and Rifle Regiment 115 actually found itself charging on the flank of the panzers instead of coming in behind them. At 16:00 hours, says the Division, 'After a short reorganization the Panzer Regiment advanced again and pushed deeper into the enemy lines. II/8 turned away to the north-west to relieve the infantry regiment and beat off a counter-attack on the left by 20 tanks.'
It was at this moment that Lieut.-Colonel Garr, commanding the composite regiment of 22nd Armoured Brigade, on the extreme right of the British position, decided to intervene. 'Suddenly', reported Anti-Tank Unit 33, 'the enemy opened fire from the left flank, where Ariete should have been, at first with artillery and then with tanks and Bren carriers.' The second Batterie of the unit was brought up to deal with the British tanks, and a platoon of the anti-tank troops belonging to the infantry regiment, significantly described as unable 'to go forward because of the heavy fire and waiting among the supply vehicles of Rifle Regiment 115, was brought up to engage the advancing enemy tanks'. The 'dangerous gap which threatened to open behind the infantry regiment' caused the German commanders considerable alarm, and the anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery which habitually covered the flanks of the panzer regiment were hurried up and thrown in against the British tanks. They claim, 'A violent action took place in which 5 enemy tanks were destroyed. The enemy was forced to abandon his intention of pushing through the gap and retire north. Ariete Division then closed up.'
On the other side, the 22nd Armoured Brigade War Diary describes how, as the German tanks came in sight from the west, 'we were heavily shelled our left flank and the right comer of the S.A. Brigade leaguer being the worst sufferers'. As the enemy tanks approached, the Sqn under Major Walker, 4 Sharpshooters, went in, out again, then in. The plan was to withdraw to the NE leaving our original position open for the South African gunners to have a good shot at the enemy tanks left front. Owing to the steady advance of the enemy and the continued shelling from his rear, we were never able to break off action with the enemy tanks.
As the panzers pressed on, the tanks of 22nd Armoured Brigade rallied, the composite Sqn 4 Sharpshooters under Major Walker engaged them on the left while Lt Col Garr rushed to the right flank, rallied the Sqn 2 RGH and led them in a glorious charge broadside across the enemy advance, every tank firing its hardest. All the time, C Bty 4 RHA and the SA Arty were firing hard into the enemy's right flank.
On the right wing Panzer Regiments—reduced to forty tanks after the battle of the landing-ground on the previous day—together with Infantry Regiment 200, were making what was virtually an independent assault. The Panzer Regiment's Report states that their orders were to advance 'toward Point 179 (east of Rugbet en Nbeidat)' and their line of march would have taken them past the eastern flank of 5th S.A. Brigade. The Report continues, however, 'After moving a few kilometres NNE, No. 1 Battalion came under heavy shell-fire. The direction of the advance was altered. Shortly after that, enemy tanks appeared from the right, and heavy fighting developed.' The panzers then swung left, towards the north-west, into the mass of transport belonging to 5th S.A. Infantry Brigade.
On the right of the German line the attack encountered much the same hazards as on the left. Here too the orderly progression of tanks and infantry, with their supporting artillery, which Cruewell had envisaged, gave place to confusion. Infantry Regiment 200, which had been facing south towards 1st S.A. Brigade and the Support Group, complained that they had been given a bare twenty minutes to turn their transport about and face north, and that during the move the motor-cycle battalion told off to lead the attack became badly bogged down in the wet sand. The field Batterie also went astray and does not seem to have come up into line at all. By the time the Regiment was ready, 'there was a considerable gap between them and the tanks ahead'.
Here too, the advance came under heavy artillery fire from the north-west: 'Some of the leading troops of 15th Motor-Cycle Battalion drew back and threatened to halt the advance. The immediate intervention of the regimental commander prevented this, and after a short interruption the advance was resumed.' The commander of 15th Rifle Brigade appeared with news that the infantry on the left wing could make little headway and ordered Regiment 200 to swing to the east where resistance seemed to be less. The westward wheel of Panzer Regiment 5 had deprived the infantry on the right wing of their spearhead of tanks, and the increasing shell and anti-tank fire from north and north-west, and machine-gun and heavy mortar fire from ahead, caused the motor-cycle battalion to falter and fall back. Machine-Gun Battalion 2 was brought up from the rear, but also floundered in the wet sand and, in face of heavy fire, debussed early. Night was falling before they pushed through and, according to their claim, captured 'two batteries and a large number of prisoners' without either tank or artillery support.
By that time, however, resistance within the perimeter was at an end. As the line of German tanks and troop-carriers topped the rise to the south and bore down upon the B Echelon, the mass of defenceless vehicles took to flight once more, spreading alarm and chaos as they went. Some say that they 'began streaming to the south-west': the Scots Guards assert that 'this transport with some armoured cars began moving east as soon as the attack began'. The eastward movement seems. the more likely, and the hasty departure of the transport units is understandable enough, but the spectacle of a mass of bolting transport cannot' have been good for younger members of the Brigade facing their first serious battle, while the resulting confusion hampered the attempts of the artillery to deal with the German armour. Some units retained a sort of cohesion even in flight, and the reports of 4th S.A. Reserve Motor Transport Company and 5th S.A. Brigade Workshops describe how they escaped through the eastern face of the perimeter and across the New Zealand position, before turning to join 1st S.A. Brigade away to the south.
The diagonal approach of the Germans crashed into the 5th Brigade position at its south-west corner, and 7th S.A. Field Battery sited on the south of the B Echelon, and E Troop of 9th S.A. Field Battery, which lay south of the Irish, were soon firing over open sights. The array of antitank guns along the southern face of the position—British and South African—also joined in, and a company of the Scots Guards in this area, together with B Company of and Regiment Botha, met the German infantry with a furious fusillade of mortar, machine-gun and rifle fire.
It was not long before the field-artillery began to run short of ammunition and the gunners called urgently for replenishment. 'Two messages', says Major Harris of 7th S.A. Field Battery, 'were received from my troop commanders asking for ammunition.' But the thrust of the panzers deep into the B Echelon had scattered the battery vehicles.
Captain Millar went back on receipt of the first message and I on the second. I had no idea at this stage that the enemy tanks had broken through the first intimation I had was when I ran into three tanks which put my armoured car out of action with two well-aimed shots. In the terrific movement of MT (both own and enemy) which was taking place around me, I was unable to spot any of my ammunition vehicles and can only presume that they had been removed by the drivers. All ammunition with the guns was fired at the enemy, including smoke.
The artillery commander with the South African Division reports that all this while the gun crews were under 'heavy rifle, mortar and MG fire: some guns received direct hits causing heavy casualties among the detachments'. As the ammunition on the gun positions gave out, the surviving pieces were put out of action, and what was left of their crews got away on the remaining transport.
Radio Communication with the UDF’s 5th South African Infantry Brigade Lost
Radio communications with 5th South African Infantry Brigade ended abruptly at 15 55 and were never again restored. As day turned into night, it became apparent that the brigade had been annihilated. A few survivors who had escaped the killing, managed to reach safety in a shocked condition. They were fed and given blankets to protect them against the cold winter night. Of the 5,800 men who went into battle, 2,964 were listed as either dead, wounded or captured in this, the Union’s first battle of the Desert War. In his dispatches to London, Auchinleck explained that, in spite of gallant resistance by the 5th South African Infantry Brigade, the German attack was well conceived and executed resulting in the practical destruction of the South African force.
The Galant UDF Soldiers on their Harley-Davidsons
In the battle of Sidi Rezegh in November 1941, motorcycles played a supportive role. Despatch riders volunteered and assisted with casualties and time and again rode their motorcycles under a hail of lead and shrapnel returning with wounded men on their carriers to First Aid stations in the field.
